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Abstract 
In my paper, I researched how closely South Korea and Brazil followed the strategies of 
their expressed economic growth plans, outward- and inward-oriented, respectively. I 
chose these two countries as representatives ofEast Asia and Latin America because of 
the similarities in their earlier economic positions, their concurrent growth, and the 
increasingly divergent outcomes oftheir economic policies. I found that both countries 
were more centrally oriented in their policies, combining a little ofboth strategies and 
finding the right mix for their economies and social structures. My paper is divided into 
three sections, one on the political climate just before and during the initial stages of 
development, another covering the protectionist role of the government, and a third on the 
role of multinational corporations and direct foreign investment in the development of 
Brazil and South Korea. 
Inward-oriented economies are usually pursued by countries desiring more autonomy and 
less dependence on foreign markets for the demand of a country' s own products or for the 
supply ofproducts to that country' s domestic market. Brazil has always preferred this 
plan and initially turned to foreign markets only to gain capital from the sale ofher 
abundant natural resources. There is foreign direct investment in Brazil, but it is 
conducted under the watchful eye of the Brazilian government. Joint projects are actively 
encouraged and there are "local content" laws requiring that foreign manufactures buy 
their intermediate goods from local suppliers. Certain industries, such as petroleum and 
hydroelectric energy, are state-owned because the Brazilian government does not want 
any amount of foreign involvement in these key industries. 
Outward-oriented economic plans are usually adopted by countries desiring an active role 
in international markets. It is important to note that South Korea began its First Five-Year 
Plan in 1961 with the intention ofbeing inward-oriented. Japan and the U.S. were the 
major markets interested in South Korean development. Fresh from the W.W.II and 
Korean War battlefields, the people were in favor of independent development, especially 
without ties to Japan. Nonetheless, by the Second Five-Year Plan in 1964, South Korea 
had to abandon import-substitution. Aid from the U .S. had dropped dramatically and the 
country did not have the necessary resources to raise the capital needed to import industry 
and achieve agricultural self-sufficiency. The country was on the brink of a balance-of­
payments crisis. South Korea turned to the sale of low technology, labor-intensive 
products in foreign markets to fund her industrialization. 
The growth strategies of the two countries share many similarities, such as protection of 
domestic industries, government intervention in the economy, and the ultimate goal of 
political and economic autonomy. The key difference has been the responsiveness of their 
governments to the needs of the economy. South Korean officials reacted more quickly to 
the need for stabilization, liberalization, and export expansion. Brazilian officials 
attempted to "catch up" by implementing more drastic and, ultimately, less successful 
measures. 
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I. Introduction 
Comparative analyses of the development patterns ofLatin American and East Asian countries 
abound in the economics sections of any library. The two regions beg comparisons because of 
the similarities in their earlier economic positions, their concurrent growth, and the 
progressively divergent outcomes of their growth strategies. Countries in the two regions are 
also used as "real-life" comparisons of the effectiveness of inward- and outward-oriented 
development policies, with East Asia representing the former and Latin America the latter. 
This "typecasting" is effective when used as a general means of comparison for the two 
regions, but begins to break down on a country-specific level. It is this breakdown that I 
wanted to examine more closely. I chose to look at South Korea and Brazil with this goal in 
mind. Each is fairly representative ofher region, yet both have differed enough from the 
inward and outward-oriented recipes for success to demonstrate how these broad 
generalizations can paint a picture of the path to development that is not completely accurate. 
It is much more accurate to realize that both countries combine parts of inward and outward­
oriented strategies to create balances appropriate for their respective cultures and resources. 
First, it is important to understand what is generally meant by an "inward-looking" or an 
"outward-looking" development policy. Todaro's textbook definition of an inward-looking 
development strategy stresses the concepts of "self-reliance... , the development of indigenous 
appropriate technology, the imposition of substantial protective tariffs and nontarifftrade 
barriers to promote import substitution, and the general discouragement ofprivate foreign 
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investment" (685). The same textbook defines the outward-looking development strategy as 
"encourag[ing] free trade, the free movement of capital... , and welcome to multinational 
corporations, and an open system of communication" (693). While not expressly mentioned in 
the definitions, these development strategies are often assumed to employ a certain amount of 
state intervention. Because ofthe emphasis on free trade and the free movement of capital, 
little government intervention is expected in outward-looking economies. Inward-looking 
economies employing tariffs and nontariff barriers are expected to have high levels of 
government intervention. It is very difficult for a developing economy to have little or no 
government intervention, whether inward or outward-looking, however, after development has 
progressed a bit, an outward-looking economy would be expected to allow market forces to act 
freely. 
ll. The Political Climate at the Start ofDevelopment 
A. South Korea 
The political climate at the onset of development is a large determinant of which growth 
strategy is chosen. Since South Korea had just come out of an extended period of occupation 
by the Japanese (1910-1948) ultimately ending in a war that separated her from North Korea, 
the country's leaders and people desired economic self-sufficiency and increased political 
autonomy. For this reason, South Korea began its development following the Korean War 
intending to employ import-substitution, concentrating on domestic markets that grew daily as 
North Korean refugees poured into the country. 
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South Korea's first elected president, Syngman Rhee, depended largely on U.S. aid for support 
during the first ten years of South Korean independence and did little to promote the 
development of the country. Because the U.S. considered the promotion of democracy in 
South Korea to be of the utmost importance, the amount of aid allocated to the country was 
substantial. During the 1950's, this amount is estimated to have averaged 15 percent of GNP 
in South Korea (James, et al. 103). The North had retained the majority of the country's 
physical resources and the industrial base left by the Japanese, while two-thirds of the industry 
in South Korea was destroyed in the Korean War (1. Kwon in Kwon 34). South Korean 
economic growth was virtually stagnant under Rhee, who was eventually forced to resign 
because of corruption in his government and the public's anger over the continuing economic 
decline. 
Rhee's successor, Park Chung Hee, hoped to make South Korea less dependent on the U.S. 
and to regain more centralized political and economic control. He instituted South Korea's 
First Five-Year Plan in 1961-62 stressing agricultural self-sufficiency and the development of 
an industrial base financed by primary exports. Park negated earlier gains made toward a more 
democratic government by taking control of the press, outlawing demonstrations, and 
broadening the power of the state to arrest and convict dissidents. He also strengthened 
government ties to the economy. This strengthening was accomplished by founding a 
"government-dominated trade union federation (the Federation ofKorean Trade Unions) .... 
[n]ew economic planning institutions g[iving] him control of tariff and exchange-rate policy and 
the national budget. ... [and] by seizing all outstanding shares in the commercial banking system 
and tightening control over the bank ofKorea, ,, . [enabling him] to shape interest rates and credit 
4 
policy" (Hart-Landsberg 30). Chronic government corruption involving bribes, kickbacks, and 
manipulation of the South Korean stock market also evolved, problems hearkening back to the 
Rhee regime (Ibid.). 
Under Park's import-substitution plan, South Korea began to encounter huge deficits in the 
balance of trade despite large amounts of government spending. This was a particularly 
frustrating problem since the concept ofproducing goods locally for domestic markets instead 
of importing those same goods had been expected to encourage a stable balance of trade. U. S. 
aid that had controlled this problem during Rhee's tenure had been reduced, and Park's 
strategy was not leading to any type of sustainable growth. South Korea was too poor to rely 
on domestic demand to support growth and was on the brink of a balance-of-payments crisis. 
In the Second Five-Year Plan (1964-1965), the government was forced to switch to an export­
led strategy, a move that would be continued in the five subsequent five-year plans (Ibid., 28). 
This change in growth strategy was met with strong support by the United States and Japan. 
The U.S. had previously supported South Korea out of purely political motivations, to prevent 
the spread of communism~ now she had economic incentives, as well. America wanted to 
reduce South Korea's dependence on monetary support, while both the U.S and Japan saw a 
blossoming market for their exports and fertile ground for foreign direct investment. 
Japan was interested in South Korea as a business partner for the same reasons she had taken 
South Korea as a Japanese colony in 1910 -- markets, human resources, and political clout in 
Asia. However, political relations between the two countries still were not normalized when 
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South Korea first began pursuing economic development. The Japanese had controlled large 
Korean farms during their occupation, farms that had been repossessed from the original 
Korean owners. Park recognized the mutual benefits of accepting monetary retribution from 
Japan for these property claims. South Korea would receive much-needed capital, and Japan 
would have "paid her debt" to South Korea, improving political relations and paving the way 
for Japanese investment in the developing country. Opponents of this move represented those 
with anti-Japanese sentiments as well as those in opposition to the Park government; the 
dissidents feared the increased power and control the Japanese resources would give political 
leaders. Ultimately, the military and the Japanese approved a settlement in 1962 that included 
a $300 million grant, $200 million in government-to-government grants, and $100 million in 
commercial financing, creating a huge infusion of capital into the South Korean economy (S. 
Haggard and T. Cheng in Deyo 112). 
Park's centralized political system lingered even after the country moved toward an export­
oriented growth path. Government intervention in the economy remained very high, as 
indicated by the many government incentives for exporting domestically produced goods. 
Protection for selected industries that had been introduced in the First Five-Year Plan 
continued long after the switch in growth strategies. Investment was concentrated into heavy 
industry such as steel, shipbuilding, petrochemicals, and cars. Economies of scale in these 
industries led to the development of large conglomerates 1 like POSCO, Samsung, Hyundai, 
Daewoo, and Lucky-Goldstar. The South Korean economy began to rely heavily on these huge 
1 These large conglomerates are often referred to by their Korean name,jaebul or chaebol. 
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companies, with the five mentioned earlier accounting for 22% of all manufacturing sales in 
1987 ("Survey," 1988). See Table 1. 
B . Brazil 
The prospect ofBrazilian development was also very attractive to developed nations, and 
especially to their multinational corporations (MNC's). Already drawn by Brazil's seemingly 
limitless supply ofnatural resources, the First World recognized the importance of expanding 
MNC's into Latin America. Additionally, the United States was sensitive to any effects the 
Cuban Revolution of 1959 might have on Brazil and other countries in the area. The U.S. 
government supported Brazil's efforts to adopt democracy and encourage economic growth in 
hopes it "would not only lead to development but would also avoid other Cuba's" (T. Bruneau 
in Bruneau 1). 
Brazil's development had a more drawn-out beginning than South Korea's because an 
instantaneous political transformation never took place. Pereira describes Brazil as being a 
semi colonial country up until the Brazilian National Revolution in 1930. This event kicked off 
industrialization with the establishment of a domestic market through the liberation of the 
middle-class and the creation of a political climate conducive to development (Pereira 17). 
Pereira argues that the Revolution of 1930 also signified the end of the "agrarian-commercial 
oligarchy" that had been in power for four hundred years (15). After decades of military rule, 
the new "industrial bourgeoisie" and "urban proletariat" yearned for an independently 
successful Brazil. Again, import-substitution was the strategy of choice. 
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While Brazil was not a direct participant in the war, World War II did affect Brazilian 
development. Domestic demand increased as imports declined, nonetheless, industrial 
development was reduced due to a dependence on imported equipment. The end of the war 
coincided with the fall of the dictatorship of Getulio Vargas, a leader who had actively 
promoted state intervention in the economy as a means of expanding his dictatorial hold on 
Brazil. The replacement government possessed "[a] future orientation and a confidence in 
national purpose that could be called developmental nationalism" (Robock 42). After the brief 
return ofVargas and state capitalism, luscelino Kubitschek was elected and proceeded to 
launch an array of economic development projects and to allow foreign capital to be invested in 
Brazil. The period from 1956-1961 cemented Brazilian industrialization with industrial output 
increasing at an average annual rate of 11% and the real domestic product averaging at a 6% 
annual growth rate. See Table 2. The emphasis on industrialization as a central goal was 
widely accepted by the military, the private sector, the general public, and political leaders. 
Policy makers used the foreign exchange credits that had accumulated during the war to 
increase Brazil's industrial base, and a rise in coffee prices accounted for an improvement in 
her terms of trade that also aided the acceleration of industrialization (pereira 23). During the 
period 1945-1955, the average annual growth rate was 6.5% and total growth was 130% (Ibid. 
21). Throughout this period the tariff policy first initiated in 1890 designed to protect domestic 
production remained in effect, excluding a brief respite in 1946-47. The Law of Similars2 
combined with the overvaluation of the cruzeiro kept the "demand for imports within levels 
2 First implemented in 1890, the Law of Similars states that imports can be restricted and even banned if similar, 
locally produced goods exist. See Mark Stephens and William E. Cole, "The Brazilian Motor Vehicle Industry: 
A Holistic Approach to Project Evaluation," in Journal ofEconomic Issues xxn.l (1988): 381 . 
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compatible with the availability of foreign exchange" (Gomes 192). The importation of inputs 
was further facilitated by allowing foreign investors to import equipment free of charge. Many 
of the independence-oriented bourgeoisie disagreed with this incentive because Brazilians were 
not always the main beneficiaries. By the 1950's, the foreign investment opponents' calls for 
autonomy were drowned out by the penetration of transnational corporations. Multinational 
corporations' investments in Brazil were carefully monitored by the government. Officials 
pushed for joint ventures, especially through "local content requirement" regulations supporting 
local supplier companies (Robock 66). The Brazilian government had decided that rapid 
development partially financed with foreign capital they could control was more important that 
complete self-sufficiency achieved at a snail's pace. 
Both countries began with political and economic autonomy through import substitution in 
mind. This strategy is necessarily more geared toward a country rich in natural resources. The 
two countries' huge differences in physical resources, at least in part, explain why South 
Korea, a nation sadly lacking in natural resources, could not support this strategy, even for its 
First Five-Year Plan, and Brazil, a country renowned for its abundance ofprimary 
commodities, continues today to rely on its resources to supply Brazilian industries, as well as 
for export earnings. 
It should also be noted that both countries strayed from the usual understanding of what it 
means to be an inward or outward-looking economic nation. South Korea turned to an export­
driven economic growth strategy only after failing in import-substitution. Park, representing 
the moods of most South Koreans, initially balked at the prospect of continued dependence on 
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the United States and, especially, Japan for economic success. After the First Five-Year Plan 
proved to be unsuccessful, he decided that foreign capital was necessary to tum the economy 
around. Only then did South Korea begin to implement outward-looking policies. 
Brazil, on the other hand, benefited from higher levels of foreign direct investment than is 
generally expected from an inward-looking nation desiring autonomy. While known for her 
state-dominated economy, Brazil under Kubitscheck and others, nevertheless, actively 
encouraged foreign investment through the implementation of incentives such as the duty-free 
importation of industrial equipment. These incentives were especially geared toward areas 
emphasizing technology. Foreign investment was still avoided during the initial stages of 
industrialization in "strategic areas" such as the petroleum, steel, electric power, and finance 
sectors (Robinson 96). Outside of these sectors, however, foreign investment was welcomed. 
The two countries desired economic development on their own terms, but broadened their 
scopes to include what was required to be successful. To succeed, South Korea would not 
have been able to rely on the exportation ofprimary products to support a heavy industrial base 
and both countries could not have relied solely on their domestic markets to have the buying 
power to finance industrialization. Their governments recognized these facts and took the 
situations into their own hands, implementing corrective policies that sometimes went against 
popular opinion and their own publicly expressed stances on the role of foreign investment in 
their economies. Their leaders discovered that the political preferences of the two countries did 
not always facilitate economic success. 
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m. The Role of Government in Development 
A. South Korea 
South Korea's government has been called the "senior partner" in South Korean business (C. 
Johnson in Deyo 138). This characterization is not far from the truth. The connection between 
government and business (especially involving the conglomerates) cannot be overstated. In 
addition to the government's active promotion of key industries and zealous exporting through 
incentives, the government's role in the economy was also manifested in its control of credit 
institutions and banks. This power, more than anything, inextricably linked government and 
conglomerates. See Table 3 for a breakdown ofgovernment export incentives. Song describes 
South Korean economic decision-making as having been "overwhelmingly a 'top-down' 
process" in The Rise ofthe Korean Economy (140). The paradox ofprivate enterprise 
operating under the thumb ofhighly centralized government policy-makers has long been a 
subject of debate. In his article "Political Institutions and Economic Performance: the 
government-business relationship in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan," Johnson maintains that 
the key word describing the relationship between government and business is "coexistence" not 
"domination," but as South Korean businesses have become less dependent on perks and 
favors from government, increasing numbers of businessmen have complained about what they 
consider to be the over-reaching role of government in financial decision-making. Their 
discontent combined with the complaints of trading partners have led to the government 
lessening its control incrementally over the past ten years. 
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The government took control of the economy very early in development. Once an export­
driven strategy was decided upon at the advent of the Second Five-Year Plan, a number of 
economic measures promoting this choice were put into effect by the government: (1) the won 
was devalued~ (2) a unified floating exchange rate system replaced the multiple exchange rate 
system~ and (3) tax exemptions, export subsidies, tax breaks on the importation of intermediate 
goods for export industries, and foreign exchange loans were all adopted. See Table 4. 
Corporate tax incentives were increased and large government loans were given to selected 
industries and "channeled through a tight nexus ofgovernment, banks, and businesses" (Kwon 
35). These "selected industries" were, on the whole, only the industries showing the most 
promise since all were infant industries at the start of industrialization. 
The government loans given to selected companies served two purposes- first, to jump-start 
industry and, second, to hold these businesses accountable to the government. The second 
purpose illustrates how conflicting this partnership was/is with the basic nature of 
entrepreneurship in a capitalistic society. In his article "The Uncommon Characteristics of the 
Korean Economic Development," Jene K . Kwon describes these government policies as having 
effectively "tak[ en] the risk out of entrepreneurship" (Kwon 36). The conglomerates flourished 
since they were the main recipients of these safety-net loans. The government was, in effect, 
creating comparative advantages for certain industries. 
The government also intervened in another key area of the economic landscape. The promotion 
of exports was not accompanied by import liberalization like one would expect in a 
competitive, outward-looking economy. Imports were strictly controlled by tariff barriers and 
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quantitative restrictions until liberalization was first attempted in 1978 (Ibid. 39). However, 
these industries receiving protection were strongly encouraged to become internationally 
competitive. High profits were reinvested in industry, and the profits from new technology 
were taxed at low levels. Domestic prices could not exceed international prices for prolonged 
periods. These protected industries were expected to be competitive in international markets 
within a few years (James, et al. 33). This "safety-net" was not available indefinitely, and the 
industries were aware of that. 
The gradual import liberalization that began in 1978 continues to the present. For example, 
quantitative restrictions were removed on 1000-1250 items3 between 1986 and 1994 (United 
Nations 207). From the mid-80' s on, South Korea has pledged to liberalize its economy. 
Protection still exists in some key industries and domestic trade unions continue to be 
influential in forming import policies, but direct subsidies, quantitative restrictions, high tariffs, 
and government-sponsored loans have been discarded. Korea's chronic bilateral surplus with 
the U.S., for example, had roused much criticism and negative press. South Korean officials 
eventually recognized that they could not afford to not liberalize. Table 5 illustrates the 
declining percentage of imports with restrictions and the declining average tariff rate on those 
restricted imports between the years 1978 and 1985 .. 
South Korea's protectionist measures aside, the country' s exports have been unusually prone to 
protection abroad. See Table 6. In his article "Korean Trade as Outlier," Petri attributes this to 
Japanese-triggered heightened sensitivity to trade imbalances (Kwon). South Korean exporting 
3 In 1990' s, the restrictions removed have primarily involved agricultural products. 
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was initially facilitated by trade restrictions against Japan in key South Korean manufacturing 
sectors such as steel and automobiles. After a period of success, the importing nations 
recognized the same trade problems in their dealings with South Korea, and proceeded to 
establish restrictions on Korean exports, as well. 
B . Brazil 
South Korea's attitude toward protectionism is pivotal in the overall comparison ofBrazil and 
South Korea. InAsian Development, James, Naya, and Meier postulate that "the degree and 
duration ofprotection afforded to an industry is a significant factor in its subsequent 
development" with "high rates of protection for prolonged periods usually result[ing] in 
inefficient, monopolistic industry" (33). These are the very charges often leveled against 
Brazil. Critics say that, unlike South Korean industry, Brazilian industries do not face the 
possibility of government protection coming to an end and, therefore, businesses become 
inefficient and unable to compete internationally without subsidies. 
There exists another, more favorable view ofBrazil's history of state intervention. In 
Development and Crisis in Brazil, 1930-1983, Pereira describes the 
interventionist/protectionist model as the more bourgeois-oriented economic strategy, and 
economic liberalism is portrayed as the "ideological arm of the Brazilian rural aristocracy" 
(70). The author maintains, as do others, that Brazil's cultural and historical background 
centering around huge plantations, or latifundios, would have lead to the established 
aristocracy always being the most competitive and ultimately the most successful in a laissez­
faire economy. Ultimately, this perpetually dominant aristocracy would have prevented "the 
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emergence of an industrial entrepreneur class" (pereira 71). It can be inferred, therefore, that 
the emerging middle-class believed that, through the adoption of an inward-looking economy 
driven by state intervention, Brazil would not only achieve international independence, but that 
they would finally liberate themselves from the Brazilian ruling class. 
Whether one agrees with Pereira or not, the fact remains that Brazilian protectionism and the 
expansion of the state-owned sector have steadily decreased since the late-1970's. The 
national government did not publish statistics on the number of state-owned firms until the 
early 1980's. In 1993, there were over 700 state-owned firms, with 50 ofthose representing 
the most significant in terms of investment and size. The largest 10 government-owned firms 
account for approximately 67 percent of federal assets (Robinson 97). The Figueiredo 
administration began the push toward privatization in all sectors excluding utilities, mining, and 
transportation in 1979. Manufacturing, commerce, and agriculture are almost exclusively in 
private hands now, and the trend is expected to continue (Ibid.) 
The Figueiredo government made even more sweeping changes to Brazilian interventionist 
policies in 1979. In March, export subsidies were reduced and completely eliminated by 
December. This resulted in a 40% drop in export incentives, from 62% in 1979 to 37% in 
1980 (Clements 21). Subsequently, the cruzeiro was devalued by 30% to compensate 
exporters (Ibid.). Certain subsidies were reintroduced in 1981, but the role of subsidies in 
economic policy has continued to decrease throughout the 1980's. Manipulation of the 
exchange rate has emerged as the principal policy tool (Ibid.). 
15 
N . The Role of Direct Foreign Investment and Multinational Corporations 
A. South Korea . 
While direct foreign investment has become progressively more important in South Korean 
economic growth, debt was initially the key tool used in financing the country's development. 
Unlike the other Asian Tigers, South Korea borrowed heavily in international capital markets 
which shifted some of the emphasis away from direct foreign investment (DFI) and the 
involvement of multinational corporations (MNC's). See Table 7. Between 1967 and 1971 
foreign savings averaged 39.5% of total savings, though only 3.7% of this was direct foreign 
investment. During that same time period, direct investment accounted for over 30 percent of 
total capital flow in Brazil. From 1972-76, foreign savings had dropped to 25% of total 
savings in South Korea, with DFI accounting for 7.9% for the total inflow of foreign capital. It 
was 23% in Brazil between 1972 and 1976 (S. Haggard and T. Cheng in Deyo 94). The 
government channeled these borrowed funds into its selected industries, "preferr[ ing] the local 
bourgeoisie to multinationals as its main partner in promoting export-led industrialization" 
(Lim 130). 
The South Korean system ofgovernment incentives and protection for domestic industry 
limited the impact ofMNC's. In certain sectors, such as electronics, multinationals dominated 
the industries, but government support for local businesses allowed these businesses to develop 
production experience and expand technologies without "going under." Government 
protections were especially effective in keeping MNC's out ofheavy industries. What resulted 
was a "sectoral pattern of foreign investment" with the concentration ofDFI shifting over time 
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(Ibid. 95). Investment began in textiles, apparel and electronic components during the early 
stages of development. Later, in the 1970' s, DFI shifted toward consumer and industrial 
electronics. The role ofJ\.1NC's can be better explained in Table 8. In the two leading sectors, 
textiles and "other," which accounted for over half of all manufactured exports, J\.1NC ' s 
accounted for approximately 13% in both sectors. Yet, in the third leading sector, electronics, 
J\.1NC's accounted for almost 90%. These figures demonstrate how the role ofJ\.1NC's could 
be misconstrued. Far from being dominant in all sectors ofmanufacturing exports, the J\.1NC's 
played a key role in one main sector and several more minor sectors, for example metal 
products and machinery (Ibid. 96). Overall, the conglomerates, strengthened by protectionist 
measures, served as the backbone of development. 
Government and the conglomerates actively pursued joint ventures involving DFI. Early in 
development, DFI was completely shut out of certain sectors, but as the need for foreign 
technology increased, these restrictions were relaxed. Companies proposing at least 50% local 
ownership were automatically approved. If local ownership was less than 50%, the proposal 
was subject to approval by the government (Balassa in Kwon 11). 
Japan and the United States have been South Korea's major investors and trading partners. 
The two countries also played crucial roles in the advancement of technology in South Korea. 
The United States is South Korea' s most important export market, and many have argued that 
South Korea is too dependent on the U.S. market. The U.S. ' s share ofKorean exports reached 
its peak in 1986 at 38.5% and 36% in 1990 (petri in Kwon 63). Japan provided one-third of 
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imports in 1990, making her South Korea's largest import source, despite government policies 
aimed at diversifying sources. 
InAsian Development, James, Naya, and Meier note that when Japan and the u .S. first began 
investing in South Korea, the two countries focused on different sectors. Between 1962 and 
1972, Japanese investment was geared toward labor-intensive, low-technology industries. u.S. 
investment, in contrast, was more focused on skill-intensive, high-technology industries. 
However, from 1973-1978, Japan shifted her investment toward skill-intensive, high­
technology industries, as well. The United States has always maintained a higher level of 
capital-intensive industries, but the mutual concentration in high-technology areas continues to 
the present day. James, Naya, and Meier conclude that Japan's shift in foreign investment 
from low-technology to high-technology mirrored a similar shift in the Japanese domestic 
economy (125). 
B. Brazil 
Between 1947 and 1967, state-owned companies dominated the developing Brazilian 
economy. This trend toward state-owned business continued, even after the proliferation of 
DFI in Brazil. Privatization efforts were not pursued until approximately 1980 and not actively 
pursued until the late 1980's (Glade in Baer and Coes, 83). A strong sense ofnationalism and 
a desire for autonomy in special sectors such as petroleum and electric power, had led the 
country to choose import substitution, and this same decision left the economy in need of 
capital. Brazil's history ofpolitical instability kept many potential investors away, forcing the 
government to fund much-needed infrastructure and invest in industry. In Brazil: The Giant 
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ofLatin America, Robinson explains that "state ownership in Brazil has sometimes been a 
matter of ideology, sometimes a pragmatic means of speeding up the process of economic 
growth" (93). 
In the 1960' s, Latin America realized that her current method of industrialization was not 
moving the area economies any closer to independence, so she began to restructure her trade 
policies (O.M. Goma in Sunke1273). Integration among the Latin American countries was 
promoted and the Latin American Free Trade Association was formed (LAFTA). LAFTA 
eventually evolved into the Latin American Association for Integration (LAIA) or Asociacion 
Latinoamericana de Intergracion (ALADI) in the 1980' s. The trend toward integration 
continued into the world market. Brazil followed Chile' s lead in 1967, implementing export­
oriented shifts in policy. These changes were manifested in two main ways: 1) quotas were 
replaced with ad valorem tariffs; and 2) the exchange rate policies were revamped to avoid 
currency overvaluations (Ibid. 274). 
The new strategy worked, and with it came an increase in DFI and MNC's. These elements, in 
turn, led to an increase in manufactured exports and a general diversification of exports.. See 
Table 9. While not listed in the table, Goma quotes the percent of total exports accounted for 
by manufactures in 1960 as 3.6%. In 1970, this figure had increased to 15.3%, and escalated 
to 54.9% by 1985. During this same time period, the percent of total exports represented by 
basic agriculture plummeted from 64.7% in 1970 to 27% in 1985. The injection of foreign 
capital and technology was a huge boost to Brazilian manufacturing industries. 
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The substantial decrease in the percent ofBrazilian exports accounted for by basic goods 
cannot be explained by changing terms of trade relative to manufactured goods. Clements 
describes the drop as being a result of the combined stagnation in the demand for basic goods 
and the boom in demand for manufactured goods during the 1970's (90). The comparison of 
growth rates for the two categories illustrates the high growth rate of manufactures and the 
declining growth ofbasics in this time period. See Table 10. 
In addition, it is important to note that the two types of integration mentioned earlier, regional 
and international, initially centered on two different kinds of exports. In 1970-71, 51 % of the 
exports to neighboring and other developing countries were capital and labor intensive, while 
only 20% ofnondurable consumer goods were exported to those same countries (O.M . Goma 
in Sunkel 275). These percentages reflect the difficulty of competing with developed countries 
in areas involving technology and/or large economies of scale. Table 11 reflects this same 
phenomenon in 1985. Over 40% Brazilian exports to the U.S. and Canada are agricultural 
products, the amount of agricultural products averages 70% in Europe. Two-thirds of 
Brazilian exports to Japan in 1985 were agriculture and minerals. In contrast, the largest sector 
of exports to other ALADr countries is machinery and equipment at 20.7%. Agricultural 
products account for only 12.5% of total exports to these countries. 
In Foreign Trade Strategies, Employment, and Income Distribution in Brazil, Clements 
rejects this explanation. He states that, by the 1970's, Brazilian exports to other developing 
countries was "just as labor-intensive as those sold in the United States" (106). Clements 
4 Formerly LAFfA. 
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maintains that this "anomalous situation" in the 1970's arose from trade restrictions within 
ALADI, and that the re-emergence of the earlier trade structure represented in Table 12 is 
actually the result ofBrazil' s comparative advantage in capital intensive industries with the rest 
ofLatin America. 
Brazil' s range of trade partners is not as concentrated as the other Latin American countries. 
Latin America, as a whole, trades mainly with the United States. Most economists agree that 
bilateral trade dependence restricts development choices, especially ifone-halfof the 
partnership is considerably more powerful than the other. The Brazilian government tried to 
avoid this problem. Between the years 1960 and 1980, Brazil reduced her export dependence 
on the U.S. significantly through continued trade liberalization and intraregional trade. 
Brazilian exports to the United States decreased from 44% in 1960 to a low of 15% in 1975 
(Sanderson 124). Currently, Brazil exports approximately one-fourth ofher total exports to the 
United States (Ibid. 125). 
v. Summary 
In analyzing the development of South Korea and Brazil, one finds many similarities. Both 
protected their domestic industries through export subsidies and import restrictions, such as 
tariffs and quotas. Both experienced high levels ofgovernment intervention in their economies 
during the early stages of development. South Korea's government owned and controlled 
credit institutions, thereby determining which businesses would receive loans and capital and 
effectively deciding which companies succeeded and which did not. The Brazilian government 
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not only funded, but actually owned a large number ofbusinesses in the country, completely 
dominating key sectors, for example petroleum and mining. The two countries also shared a 
similar goal for development, to become more economically and politically independent. This 
goal, in tum, led to their mutual interest in joint ventures with MNC's and a general distrust of 
foreign direct investment where local businesses had less than a 50% stake in the project. In 
short, Brazil and South Korea used many of the same tools to facilitate economic growth. See 
Table 4. 
South Korea diverged from the typical outward-looking economy in many ways. Her expected 
focus on exporting was accompanied by multiple unexpected protective measures, such as 
tariffs, quotas, and subsidies. Often, South Korea emerged as more of an intermediate case 
between the Latin American and East Asian development examples, than as the model of an 
outward-oriented economy. 
Brazilian policy, on the other hand, differed little from what one would expect of an inward­
oriented country. Direct foreign investment was allowed with restrictions, and the government 
enacted a number ofmeasures liberalizing the economy in an effort to rejuvenate growth 
following the oil shocks of the 1970's. Nonetheless, high levels of government intervention and 
protectionism were the most common fixtures of the Brazilian economy throughout the post­
W. W.II development era. 
Even with the large number of similarities in their policies promoting economic growth, Brazil 
and South Korea are still regarded as having chosen two very different development strategies. 
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One key difference between the countries' behaviors has been the responsiveness of their 
governments to the needs of the economy. The South Korean officials reacted more quickly to 
the need for stabilization after the oil shocks, liberalization, and export expansion, while 
Brazilian officials attempted to "catch up" by implementing more drastic measures that were, 
ultimately, less successful. This lag in reactive policies was often the deciding factor in which 
country more successfully weathered a crisis in the short-term, and sustained the growth and 
development of the economy in the long-term. 
Table 1 

Jaebul Share in Manufacturing Sector (in percent) 

Groups 
Year 
Top 5 
10 
20 
30 
Sales Sales 
1978 
15.7 
21.2 
29.3 
34.1 
1982 
22.6 
30.2 
36.6 
40.7 
Sales 
1985 
23 .0 
30.2 
36.4 
40.2 
Employ 
ment 
1978 
9.5 
13 .9 
18.2 
22.2 
Employ 
ment 
1982 
8.4 
12.2 
16.0 
18.6 
Employ 
ment 
1985 
9.7 
11.4 
15.5 
17.6 
Value Value 
Added Added 
1982 1985 
17.4 18.7 
23 .1 24.2 
29.4 34.4 
33 .2 39.6 
Source: Updated from Kyu Uck Lee, Business Combinations and Economic Concentration 

(in Korean), Seoul: KDI Press, 1985. 

From Kwon, p. 327. 

Table 2 

Brazil: Real Domestic Product and Industrial Production (average annual growth rate by 

periods) 

Period 
1940-1945 
1946-1950 
1951-1955 
1956-1961 
1962-1965* 
Real Domestic Product 0/0 Industrial Out ut 
6.2 
8.9 
8.1 
11.0 
2.4 
4.7 
7.3 
5.7 
6.0 
1.9 
*Estimate for the first six months. 

Source: Fundacao Getulio Vargas and CEP AL. 

From Pereira, p.22. 

Table 3 
Korea: Composition ofExport Incentives, 1968 
Form of Incentive ~ Value of Incentiv
Ex orts 
e as Percentage of Total Merchandise 
Tariff Exemptions 
Indirect Tax Exemptions 
Wastage Allowance bl 
Overhead Rate Reductions 
Direct Tax Reductions 
Interest Subsidies 
14.4 
7.0 
2.4 
0.4 
1.1 
4.5 
Total 29.8 
Note: Korea derived a substantial amount of foreign exchange by "exporting" 
nontradeables through U .S. military procurement. In addition, there were some service 
exports. With the single exception of tourism (a very small sector in 1968), no preferences 
were given to producers ofnontradeables for "export." 
WBecause information concerning the export-import-link subsidy was closely held, we were 
unable to obtain estimates of it, though it is known to have been small in 1968. 
12/ The wastage allowance subsidy on each imported intermediate input has been estimated by 
taking the "excess" wastage rate times the difference between the domestic price of the import 
(inclusive ofnominal protection) and the domestic currency equivalent at the market exchange 
rate of its c.i.f import price (exclusive oftarift). "Excess" wastage rates were estimated on the 
basis of an informal survey by the authors and then checked against other estimates. 
Source: Larry E. Westphal and Kwang Suk Kim, "Industrial Policy and Development in 
Korea," World Bank Staff Working Paper, no. 263 (Washington, D .C., 1977), p.3-39. 
From Balassa, p. 217. 
Table 4 
Comparison ofAdopted Economic Measures 
Brazil South Korea 
currency policy 
exchange rate system 
other policies 
multiple devaluations of the 
cruzeIro 
multiple exchange rate system 
and a flexible exchange rate 
system 
wage indexation, tariffs, export 
subsidies, subsidized loans, 
price controls 
devaluation of the won 
unified floating exchange rate 
system 
tariffs, quotas, subsidized loans, 
export subsidies, tax breaks 
Table 5 

South Korea: The Share of Imports Under Average Control and the Average Tariff Rate, 

1978-85 (in percent) 

Share of restricted im ort items* Avera e nominal tariff rate 
1978 46.1 38.7 
1979 31.8 24.9 
1980 30.9 24.9 
1981 30.6 24.9 
1982 25 .3 23.7 
1983 23 .4 23 .7 
1984 19.6 21.9 
1985 12.3 21.3 
*At the beginning ofthe year. 
Sources: The Korean Ministry of Commerce and Industry and Ministry ofFinance, as cited in 
Sub Sang-Mok, "The Evolution of the Korean Economy in Historical Perspective," presented 
to the World Bank Conference on Structural Adjustment in a Newly Industrialized Country: 
Lessons from Korea (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, mimeo, June 1986), p. 35. 
From Lin, p. 124. 
Table 6 
Protection Faced by Exports to Developed Country Markets 
Ex orter NTB Covera e % value Tariff Rate 
Korea 35.2 6.6 
United States 16.1 3.8 
Japan 18.2 3.9 
Other Developed 20.3 4.1 
East Asian NIC's 29.2 6.1 
East Asian LDC's 26.3 5.3 
Other Developing 27.0 5.1 
Average 20.9 4.3 
Source: Peter A. Petri, "Korea's Export Niche: Origins and Prospects," World Development, 
16, January 1988,47-63. 
From Kwon, p . 78. 
Table 7 

Foreign direct investment as a share ofgross domestic capital formation in the gang of four, 

selected years (percentages) 

Hon Kon Sin a ore Taiwan Korea 
1960 0.5 
1965 1.6 2.7 
1966 12.5 1.3 .6 
1968 15.1 2.6 .9 
1970 21.5 2.8 1.1 
1972 4.3 a 23 .2 1.3 2.6 
1974 2.3 b 6.0 1.4 2.8 
1976 1.2 c 6.5 1.2 1.5 
1978 0.8 d 1.5 .7 
1980 .4 
a. average, 1971-73. 
b. average, 1974-75. 
c. average, 1976-77. 
d. average, 1978-79. 

Sources. For Hong Kong: calculated from Mun and Ho, 1979~ Ho, 1979~ Hong Kong, 

TI&CD, 1979. For Singapore: Yuan, 1972~ Gish, Tan & Co., 1978 ~ Singapore Dept. of 

Statistics, various issues. For Taiwan: data on foreign investment supplied by the Investment 

Commission, Ministry ofEconomic AfIairs~ capital formation figures from Republic of China, 

CEPD, various years. For South Korea: data on foreign investment supplied by the Ministry 

of Finance; capital formation figures from Bank ofKorea, various years. 

From Deyo, p. 95 . 

Table 8 
Role of foreign firms in South Korea's manufactured exports (1974) and total value added 
(1977), in percentages 
Textiles and 
apparel 
"Other" 
Electrical and 
electronics 
Chemicals 
Wood products 
Metal products 
Transport 
equipment 
Petroleum 
products 
Clay products 
Machinery 
Food 
Total, 
manufacturing 
Sectoral share 
of total Korean 
ex orts 
39.8 
16.3 
12.3 
10.0 
7.2 
3.1 
3.1 
2.6 
2.1 
2.0 
2.0 
100 
MNC share of 
exports, by 
sector 
12.2 
12.6 
88.6 
57.3 
2.1 
84.2 
.7 
56.2 
75 .0 
93.4 
8.6 
31.4 
Sectoral MNC share of 
distribution of total value 
MNCex orts added 
15.4 10 
6.5 na 
34.6 27 
18.4 13 
18.4 na 
8.3 na 
.1 8 
4.7 23 
5.1 na 
5.9 9 
.3 na 
100 na 
Sources. Calculated from Chung Lee, 1980, 1981 : "U. S. and Japanese Investment in Korea: 

A Comparative Study." Hitotsubashi Journal ofEconomics 20:26-41 . 

From Deyo, p. 96. 

Table 9 
Composition ofBrazilian Exports, 1970-1985 (Percentage ofTotal Exports by Category*) 
Year Basic A riculture Minin Semi-Manufactured Manufactured Other 
1970 64.7 10.0 9.0 15 .3 1.0 
1971 58.3 10.3 8.5 19.7 3.2 
1972 59.1 7.3 10.0 22.5 1.1 
1973 58.3 6.7 9.3 23 .1 2.6 
1974 49.2 8.4 11.5 28.5 2.5 
1975 45 .0 13 .0 9.8 29.8 2.4 
1976 49.8 10.7 8.3 27.4 3.8 
1977 49.5 7.9 8.6 31.7 2.3 
1978 38.5 8.7 11.2 40.2 1.4 
1979 33 .5 9.4 1.4 43.6 1.1 
1980 33.6 8.6 1.7 44.8 1.3 
1981 29.8 8.5 9.1 51.0 1.6 
1982 30.9 9.9 7.1 50.8 1.3 
1983 31.3 7.7 8.1 51.5 1.4 
1984 26.0 6.3 10.6 56.0 1.1 
1985 27.0 6.4 10.8 54.9 1.1 
Note: "Other" category includes reexported products and special transactions. 

*Percentage shares calculated as a share of the dollar value of exports. 

Source: Relatorio da Cacex, various yearly issues, and Brasil, Comercio Exterior, 

Estatisticas, various yearly issues. 

From Clements, p. 92. 

Table 10 
Destination ofBrazilian Exports, 1985 
Country Country Total Percentage of Total Exports 
$1000 U.S. FOB 
U.S. 6,955,930 27.13 
Canada 427,510 1.67 
Latin America 2,428,869 9.46 
European Economic Community 6,227,434 24.29 
Rest ofW. Europe 1,483,182 5.79 
Eastern Europe 1,032,192 4.03 
Japan 1,397,792 5.45 
Other Asia 1,775,978 6.93 
Middle East 1,469,718 5.73 
Africa 1,778,657 6.93 
Oceania (1) 186,100 .73 
Undeclared and Other 422,574 1.85 
Total 25,639,011 100.00 
Note: (1) includes Australia. Total does not add up to 100.00 due to rounding. 

Source: Brasil1985: Comercio Exterior, Series Estatisticas (Rio: CACEX, 1986), p. 405 . 

From Clements, p. 106. 

Table 11 
Yearly Growth Rates of Exports by Category, 1970-1985 
(Percentage Yearly Growth in U. S. $) 
Year Total Basic Semi- Manufactured 
Manufactured 
1970 18.5 14.1 18.1 46.4 
1971 6.0 -2.9 -.8 39.7 
1972 37.4 33.1 6l.7 54.5 
1973 55.3 52.1 43 .7 59.7 
1974 28.3 13.6 59.7 57.8 
1975 9.0 9.8 -7.3 14.2 
1976 16.8 2l.9 -.9 7.4 
1977 19.7 13 .9 24.0 38.3 
1978 4.4 -14.1 36.1 32.4 
1979 20.4 9.6 32.8 30.7 
1980 32.1 29.5 24.5 35.9 
1981 15.7 5.1 -9.9 3l.6 
1982 -13.4 -7.6 -32.3 -13 .7 
1983 8.6 3.6 24.3 10.0 
1984 23 .3 2.6 56.7 34.2 
1985 -5.1 -l.9 -4.0 -7.1 
Note: "Other" category includes reexported products and special transactions. 

Source: Relatorio da Cacex, various yearly issues; Brasil, Comercio Exterior, Estatisticas, 

various yearly issues. 

From Clements, p. 9l. 

Table 12 
Composition ofExports for Various Countries and Country Groups, 1985 
(percentage of Country's Total Exports by Sector) 
U.S. Canada ALADI 1 Other L.A. EEC 
Agriculture 44.8 44.6 12.5 27.8 62.5 
Textiles 3.3 13 .1 5.1 4.9 4.3 
Chemicals 4.5 3.2 12.0 9.3 3.9 
Minerals 11.0 17.5 7.7 9.3 11.4 
Metallurgy 10.6 9.7 12.6 7.6 5.4 
Mach., 13 .7 6.5 20.7 14.5 5.8 
Equip. 
Tran. Mat'l 4.6 .8 14.7 10.0 4.0 
Other 7.5 4.6 14.7 16.6 2.8 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
AELC 2 E. Euro e Other Asia Middle East 
Agriculture 74.2 68.8 22.7 48.4 
Textiles 8.0 7.8 2.9 .9 
Chemicals 3.5 .9 3.9 .6 
Minerals 1.9 16.2 10.0 2.6 
Metallurgy 2.1 5.0 47.9 10.3 
Mach., 3.0 .1 3.9 2.8 
Equip. 
Tran. Mat'l 4.4 .1 .0 1.6 27.7 
Other 3.0 .9 2.8 11.1 6.7 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Africa Oceania (3) Rest ofW. 
Euro e 
Agriculture 14.3 30.4 68.5 
Textiles 2.8 10.4 1.0 
Chemicals 1.4 4.2 12.7 
Metallurgy 5.0 13.6 15.3 
Mach., 4.2 25.1 .6 
Equip. 
Tran. Mat'l 16.1 4.8 .2 
Other 8.4 11.5 .5 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Note: Totals may not add up to 100.0 due to rounding. 
(1) Latin American Integration Association, which includes Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, 

Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuala. 

(2) European Association of Free Trade, which is comprised of Austria, Norway, Portugal, 

Sweden, and Switzerland. 

(3) Includes Australia. 

Source: Brasil1985: Comercio Exterior, Series Estatisticas (Rio: CACEX, 1986), pp. 400­
415. 
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